1. Definition
Methodological naturalism is a rule of inquiry according to which only hypotheses that are compatible in principle with the framework of the natural sciences (or reducible to it) are admitted into publicly valid theoretical explanations.
It is important to distinguish it from metaphysical naturalism:
- methodological naturalism concerns the procedure for selecting explanations;
- metaphysical naturalism concerns an assertion about what exists at the level of being.
2. Key Representatives of the Tradition
Frequently mentioned representatives include:
- W. V. O. Quine;
- Philip Kitcher;
- Susan Haack;
- Alvin Goldman;
- Hilary Kornblith.
3. The Main Thesis of the Dispute
The central problem is not “whether science works,” but this:
When methodological naturalism is used as a rule but presented as neutrality, a concealed substitution of the framework occurs.
That is:
- A procedural rule (admit what is scientifically testable) is applied as the standard of discussion.
- This rule is not explicitly stated.
- The impression arises that the subject is “simply reality,” rather than a chosen filter.
4. Why This Matters
Methodological naturalism establishes an entry filter, thereby narrowing the permissible field in advance:
- the primacy of consciousness as an ontological hypothesis;
- the irreducible status of subjectivity;
- meaning as a fundamental level of description;
- metaphysical foundations that cannot be reduced to physics.
Consequently, this filter is not “empty neutrality.” It is a position concerning the conditions under which knowledge is valid.
5. Where Substitution Usually Occurs
A typical chain looks like this:
- Methodological rule: “In public argumentation, we accept only what can be tested scientifically.”
- Implicit transition: the rule begins to be treated as a universal criterion of reality.
- Ontological conclusion: “Only what can be described by the scientific method exists.”
- Rhetorical effect: alternative ontologies are labeled irrational.
It is precisely the implicit character of the transition from procedure to ontology that is problematic.
6. Working Distinction Between Modes of Discussion
To avoid substitution, it is useful to specify the mode of response in advance.
Mode A: Within the Scientific Framework
Formula:
“If we work within methodological naturalism, only explanations potentially testable by the natural sciences are admissible.”
What this provides:
- clarity of verification criteria;
- reproducibility of argumentation;
- limits on the scope of claims.
Mode B: Ontological Discussion Without a Prior Scientific Filter
Formula:
“If the scientific criterion is not accepted as supreme, the space of hypotheses is broader; another criterion must then be specified explicitly to distinguish meaningful ontology from arbitrary fantasy.”
Possible criteria:
- logical consistency;
- self-applicability;
- explanatory power;
- conceptual economy;
- consistency with experience (in a broad sense, not only the laboratory sense).
Mode C: Connecting the Two Levels
Formula:
“Where does science as a method end, and where does ontology as interpretation begin?”
This is the key point for a sound dialogue between different philosophical positions.
7. Minimum Standard of Transparency
In complex questions of worldview, the framework should be stated explicitly:
- “The following argument is conducted within methodological naturalism”;
- or “The following is an analysis without giving priority to scientific reductionism.”
This removes the false effect of “neutrality without presuppositions” and increases the precision of the dispute.
8. Conclusion
- There is no complete neutrality in theoretical argumentation: criteria of admissibility always exist.
- Methodological naturalism is a powerful and productive procedural mode, but it is not identical with the whole of ontology.
- A critical challenge to it is legitimate when the discussion concerns not only verification procedures, but also the boundaries of what is considered real in the discourse.
Final formula:
The dispute concerns not only the content of hypotheses, but also the rules governing their admission into the field of reality.
