Duty is usually considered the reverse side of a right: if subject A has a right in relation to subject B, B’s behavior is no longer arbitrary. Such a description captures one relation from two sides. A more general construction is examined here.
A subject finds themselves under certain conditions, and under those conditions a particular behavior is required of them. Another subject does not necessarily have to perform an action or make a demand beforehand.
A subject’s duty is the necessity of particular behavior when established conditions arise.
The necessity here is not physical. The subject can behave otherwise. Necessity means that precisely this behavior is required in the relation that has arisen or under an applicable rule. Behavior includes both performing an action and refraining from an action.
This name is appropriate precisely because what is examined is the subject’s required behavior, not the obligational relationship between parties. Obligation is reserved for a binding relationship within which the corresponding rights and duties may be situated. Duty covers both the correlate of a right within such a relationship and cases such as a speed limit, where no demand has been made beforehand. The English name of this construction is duty; obligation is better reserved for the binding relationship.
Establishing a Rule and the Occurrence of a Condition
Two events must be distinguished.
First: the establishment of a rule that connects particular conditions with required behavior.
Second: the occurrence of the conditions themselves, under which this behavior becomes mandatory for a particular subject.
The activity of another subject may stand behind the first event. The state, if considered as a subject, establishes a speed limit. That action concerns the establishment of a rule.
For the second event, the activity of another subject is no longer necessary. When a person drives a car on a stretch of road with a speed limit of 60 km/h, the duty to observe the limit applies by virtue of the person being under the relevant conditions. No one has to address a demand to the person at that moment to reduce their speed.
The same distinction is visible with a deadline. A rule already connects reaching a particular age or the arrival of a certain date with the necessity of replacing a passport. When the time comes, the stipulated action is required without anyone first approaching the subject.
Another subject’s activity may be involved in establishing the rule but not in the occurrence of the condition. The question of who established the rule can temporarily be set aside for the construction of duty itself. It is enough to identify that under conditions \(C\), behavior \(R\) is required of subject \(S\).
Ways in Which Conditions Arise
A condition may arise through different paths.
An action of another subject. A consumer makes a demand that a service provider remedy defects. After that, a duty arises for the provider to consider the demand or remedy the defects, depending on which particular duty has been established.
An action of the subject who bears the duty. A person begins driving on a road with a speed limit and thereby enters the conditions to which the rule applies. By causing damage, a subject enters conditions with which a duty to compensate is associated.
The passage of time. A date arrives to which the requirement to replace a document is attached.
A change in circumstances. A situation arises in which a duty that did not previously apply to a subject now applies.
What determines the mechanism of duty is whether the circumstances with which the required behavior is associated have arisen. The origin of the condition does not by itself define that mechanism.
If we denote conditions by \(C\), the subject by \(S\), and required behavior by \(R\):
\[
C \Rightarrow O_S(R)
\]
This notation fixes the conditional character of duty. \(R\) denotes required behavior, not an action actually performed. The notation itself does not yet explain the origin of binding force.
The word “reaction” is too narrow here. It presupposes a response to the action of another subject. Required behavior may consist of an independent action, ongoing observance of a restriction, or non-interference.
Specification, Actualization, and Performance
A rule may exist before its conditions arise.
Before the deadline for replacing a passport, the rule already specifies a connection: under certain conditions the corresponding action will be required. The deadline has not yet arrived, and the stipulated action is not yet required of this subject.
These are three different statuses.
Specification. A rule already connects conditions \(C\) with behavior \(R\).
Actualization. The conditions have arisen, and the stipulated behavior is now required of the subject.
Performance. The subject has performed the required action or is observing the established restriction.
Actualization and performance must not be collapsed into one. If a condition has arisen but the subject has not performed the required action, the duty has already arisen. A distinction emerges between the required behavior and the actual behavior.
The consent of the subject bearing the duty is not the source of this duty. The subject may not wish to perform it. If the conditions are satisfied, consent neither creates the duty nor cancels it. The subject does not choose whether the duty arises. They choose whether to fulfill or violate it.
Duty and Right
When subject A has a right in relation to subject B, B’s behavior is no longer arbitrary under certain conditions. A particular action or restraint is required of B. A’s right and B’s duty describe the same relation from different positions.
This is one case in which a duty arises.
The exercise of a right by subject A may create condition \(C\), under which subject B must behave in manner \(R\). Making a demand, expressing an opinion, or filing a complaint are actions with which a rule connects the other party’s duty to assist or not to interfere.
The existence of a right and the conditions for exercising it are also distinct. A consumer may possess the legally established right to demand that defects be remedied. The provider’s concrete duty to remedy the defects depends on whether the conditions for making the demand and for performance have been met. Not every condition is a condition for the emergence of the right itself. Some conditions determine when an already specified duty must be performed.
The duty to observe a speed limit or replace a passport does not require another subject to exercise a right of demand beforehand. It is determined by the occurrence of conditions specified by the rule.
A’s right in relation to B exists where a particular action or position of A corresponds to B’s duty. The converse does not follow: a duty may be actualized without a particular other subject first exercising a right.
An examination of right through the mandatory response to a subject’s action is given in Right as a Mandatory Relation to the Subject’s Action.
Condition and Ground of Binding Force
The arrival of a deadline, the appearance of a road sign, or a change of circumstances does not in itself generate normative necessity. The necessity arises because the condition has already been connected with a particular requirement.
The condition under which a duty arises and the ground of its binding force are not the same thing.
This article fixes the construction of duty: under conditions \(C\), behavior \(R\) is required of the subject. What makes that behavior necessary is not settled here. The ground of binding force cannot be identified in advance with the state, the law, or the will of another subject.
