How Materialism Smuggles Itself into the Discussion of Consciousness

There is a characteristic logical pattern in contemporary discourse on consciousness. It has become so familiar that it almost goes unnoticed. It involves the gradual substitution of one level of assertion for another: from observed correlation, the argument moves to functional description, then to reduction, and finally to an ontological assertion. The result is the impression that the nature of consciousness has already been explained, when in reality all that has happened is an imperceptible transition from describing data to interpreting it metaphysically.

This substitution is one of the central logical problems of contemporary materialist discourse.

It can be examined step by step.

1. Correlation: What Is Actually Observed

Neuroscience demonstrates a stable relationship between particular experiences and particular brain states.

For example:

certain networks become active during recollection;
others during visual imagination;
still others during pain;
during dreaming, the interactions between brain systems change.

These are important empirical observations.

However, only one assertion follows from them:

there is a correlation between experience and brain processes.

In other words, two kinds of events are observed to occur together.

But correlation by itself does not answer the questions:

what is the cause;
what is a condition of manifestation;
what is the carrier;
and what is the primary level of reality.

In other words, correlation does not determine ontology.

2. Functional Description: The Next Level

The next step is functional language.

Here one hears:

this brain region participates in forming images;
this system integrates sensory data;
this network suppresses external signals during sleep.

Functional description is useful. It enables us to model the behavior of systems and predict changes in states.

But functional description answers only the question:

how the elements of a system interact.

It does not answer another question:

what the experienced phenomenon itself is.

One can describe mechanisms of information processing, but this does not explain:

why subjective phenomenality exists, what philosophers call qualia.

A function is a role within a system.
It is not an explanation of the nature of experience.

3. Reduction: The First Logical Substitution

After functional description, another step often follows.

The claim is made:

since particular brain processes are necessary for experience, experience must be identical to those processes.

But a logical substitution occurs here.

Dependence is not identity.

If changing one process affects another, this does not yet mean that one process is completely reducible to the other.

The classic logical error here is this:

a condition of manifestation is mistaken for the source of the phenomenon.

For example, if one cannot hear a radio broadcast without a radio receiver, this does not mean that the music is entirely exhausted by the receiver’s circuitry.

This example does not prove an alternative theory of consciousness. But it shows the fundamental point:

the fact of dependence does not determine the ontological structure of a phenomenon.

4. The Ontological Leap

The final step is an ontological assertion.

At this level, formulations appear such as:

“it’s just the brain at work”
“it’s merely an internal simulation”
“consciousness is a product of neural activity”

At first glance, these formulations look like scientific explanations.

But upon closer examination, they are metaphysical assertions.

And such assertions do not automatically follow from the preceding levels.

In other words, a transition takes place here:

from a description of correlations
to an assertion about the nature of reality.

This transition is not rigorously justified.

5. Why the Word “Just” Plays a Key Role

The use of the word “just” is especially revealing.

The phrase:

“it’s just the brain”

creates the impression of a completed explanation.

But in reality it performs a different function:

it closes the question.

The word “just” adds no knowledge.
It merely marks the cessation of further analysis.

Language thereby conceals the incompleteness of the explanation.

6. Asymmetry of Requirements

A characteristic asymmetry arises in discussions of consciousness.

Alternative ontological models are required to meet strict standards of proof.

They are expected to provide:

complete verifiability;
a rigorous mechanism;
empirical reproducibility.

Meanwhile, the materialist interpretation is often introduced as “natural” or the “default.”

Yet it is itself a metaphysical hypothesis.

Its central assertion is:

consciousness arises entirely from the physical processes of the brain.

But this assertion has not been proven.

That is precisely why demanding strict verification only from alternative positions creates a logical asymmetry.

7. The Strength of Neuroscience and Its Limits

Neuroscience has enormous explanatory power in one area.

It is exceptionally good at describing:

relationships between brain processes;
the effects of brain damage on cognitive functions;
the dynamics of neural networks;
correlations between brain states and behavior.

But this does not mean that it has already explained:

why subjective experience exists.

This is what philosophy of mind calls the “hard problem of consciousness.”

The problem is not how the brain processes information.

The problem is why that processing is accompanied by experience.

8. The Correct Formulation

Strictly speaking, the correct position should be stated as follows:

Experience is directly given.
Neural processes are observed indirectly.
Stable correlations exist between them.
However, these correlations do not entail a final conclusion about the nature of consciousness.

In other words:

neurobiological data describe accompanying processes,
but do not provide a final ontological explanation of phenomenality.

9. The Main Conclusion

Contemporary materialist discourse on consciousness often makes a hidden ontological leap.

It begins with observed correlations,
moves to functional description,
then to reduction,
and ends with an assertion about the nature of reality.

But this transition is not logically necessary.

Therefore, the most rigorous position is to acknowledge the following fact:

the nature of consciousness remains an open philosophical question.

Neurobiology provides important data,
but these data do not, in themselves, determine the ultimate ontology of consciousness.